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Abstract
e crucial and growing role performed by dierent nancial intermediaries such as ven-
ture capitalists and angel investors as well as more traditional intermediaries such as
commercial banks in developing entrepreneurial or innovative rms and boosting product
market innovations has led to great research interest in the economics of innovation and
entrepreneurial nance. Besides this, there are some important factors or developments
which have aected the entrepreneurial nance in general as well as its inuence upon
dierent entrepreneurial or innovative rms. Indeed, it is also true that the nancial and
ownership structures of the dierent entrepreneurial rms and the legal as well as insti-
tutional environment, in which they operate, itself aects the product market innovations
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2014). erefore, in this paper I want to target a broad theme
i.e. analysis of the mechanisms behind this scenario, especially, in the context of Indian
market system.
JEL Classication: O31, O32, G11, G24
Keywords: Innovation, Financing Frictions, Entrepreneurial Finance
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1 Background: Innovation & Finance
Before going to the dynamic relationship between entrepreneurial nance and product mar-
ket innovations as well as the nexus of risk and reward in this context, it is essential to have
some brief ideas about those terms.
1.1 Innovation
As the economist and political scientist Joseph Schumpeter famously pointed out, in its
essence, innovation is novelty in how value is created and distributed. It could entail new
products or services, newmethods of production, or indeed novel forms of organising indus-
tries and rms (Schumpeter, 1934). erefore, we have to acknowledge that raw creativity
alone is insucient; knowledge of demand and the technology of production as well as ex-
ecution capacity are also necessary ingredients (Kumar and Puranam, 2012). OECD makes
a distinction between product-, process-, marketing- and organisational innovations (Oslo
manual revision 2005). is shows the broadness of the concept of innovation, going far
beyond R&D i.e. beyond the connes of research labs to users, suppliers and consumers
everywhere – in government, business and non-prot organisations, across borders, across
sectors, and across institutions. Following this broad denition, two concepts are central to
‘innovation’ for simplied notion: ‘newness’ and ‘success in the market’. Mr. Innovation
himself, the late Steve Jobs, put it more pointedly in Fortune magazine in 1998: ”Innovation
has nothing to do with how many R&D dollars you have. When Apple came up with the
Mac, IBMwas spending at least 100 times more on R&D. It’s not about money. It’s about the
people you have, how you’re led, and how much you get it.”(Jaruzelski, Staack, and Goehle,
2014)
Indeed, innovation is a diversied idea which is to be considered with the introduction
of a new feature i.e. it may be new feature to the world or the market or the company. But it
must be marked as an improvement in market through an increase in prot. is increase in
prot can be the result of a larger market share, the higher price the buyer is willing to pay
or lower cost of production and distribution. An innovation can be a beer service or prod-
uct or an improvement in the production process or business model. is innovation can
be both incremental, small step, or a more radical (or disruptive) innovation. What maers
is that the innovation contributes to the competitiveness of the rm (Tilburg, 2009). In fact,
William J. Baumol argues that innovation plays a role of at least comparable importance
for the theory of the rm and competition. us, it seems clear that it is innovation, not
price-seing, to which management gives priority in important sectors of the economy. It
is persistently forced to do so by the market. But the central body of microeconomic anal-
ysis gives its aention primarily to price determination, and by doing so may, arguably, be
omiing a critical feature of the competitive process in more recent periods. Further, the
omission removes the bridge that can connect the static and the dynamic analysis (Bau-
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mol, 2004). Actually, my main aim is to analyse innovation in the Indian real economy or
non-nancial companies due to inuences of dierent nancial intermediaries or types of
nancing and nancial innovation.
1.2 Finance
Actually, the meaning of ”Finance” is: the management of revenues; the conduct or trans-
action of money maers generally, especially those aecting the public, as in the elds of
banking and investment (“Dictionary.com” 2015). But here wewill bemore concerned about
Entrepreneurial nance, the study of value and resource allocation, applied to new ventures
or innovative enterprises. It addresses key questions which challenge all entrepreneurs:
how much money can and should be raised; when should it be raised and from whom; what
is a reasonable valuation of the start-up; and how should funding contracts and exit deci-
sions be structured (Wikipedia, 2015). Basically, if you have a fresh brilliant idea, you prob-
ably need fund for its realisation. But how do you realise such a project? It can be answered
through entrepreneurial nance (which can be analysed most realistically using principal-
agent theory due to the special consideration of client/contractor or doctor/patient relation)
e.g. think about Facebook… from Harvard dorm room to approximately 950m users in 2012.
Is it without any nancial support? No… It got funding through Peter iel, angel invest-
ment of 400k in 2004 for approximately 10% shares and voting power (Source: LA Times).
Innovative enterprises or entrepreneurial rms are, indeed, engines of economic growth
and job creation. ey seek to commercially exploit new ideas, technologies, inventions or
other scientic or market knowledge. ere are dierent development stages in the life
of a company before it becomes a commercially successful enterprise (seed, start-up, early-
growth and expansion). e net cash ow of an innovative enterprise is negative at the seed
and start-up stages before it becomes positive. Many of the traditional sources of nance
are not fully suitable for innovative enterprises. Given the negative cash ow and high risk
of failure at their early stages of development, innovative enterprises ideally need forms of
nancing that do not seek guaranteed repayment (Europe, 2009). In practice, nancing is
not free, it requires eort, potential and sometimes painful interventions. Same things hap-
pened in Facebook also. Peter eil’s angel investment led to various losses for Zuckerberg
and his colleagues, such as dilution of ownership through acquiring 10% shares, dilution of
control with some voting power, taking part in corporate governance as a board member
etc. (Source: Forbes). I think virtually all capital-formation strategies (or, simply put, ways
of nancing investment) revolve around balancing two fundamental/critical factors: risk
and reward. ese risk and reward factors, generally, exist in both sides i.e. in entrepreneur
side and in investor side. Entrepreneur and his source of venture funds will each have his
own ideas as to how these factors should be weighted and balanced. Once a meeting of the
minds takes place on these key elements, anyone would be able to do the deal.
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• Risk: e venture investors want to mitigate their risk, which an entrepreneur can
do with a strong management team, a well-wrien business plan, and the leadership
to execute the plan.
• Reward: Each type of venture investormaywant a dierent reward. An entrepreneur’s
objective is to preserve his right to a signicant share of the growth in his company’s
value as well as any subsequent proceeds from the sale or public oering of his busi-
ness.
In general, Basic principles of nancing theory, indeed, try to narrow and quantify the
development of uncertain situations i.e. information asymmetry, two sided interaction, di-
vergence of interest, time dimension etc.
According to Andrew J. Sherman, a corporate lawyer as well as business & law school
professor, there are twelve dierent ways of nancing any growing business (Figure 1).
However, some types of nancing will be more likely to easily achievable than others based
on its stage of growth as well as the current trends within its industry. ere are also certain
traditional ”stepping stones” that are usually followed. As an entrepreneur proceeds along
the line of nancing, there are fewer choices for nancing, and the criteria for qualifying
become more dicult to meet, thereby reducing his chances of rising to that level. It is also
important to bear in mind that the investors each source of nancing on that line may judge
the entrepreneur on the quality and success of the deal made on the prior stage. In other
words, angels may judge him by the extent of his own commitment, venture capitalists may
judge him by the extent of the commitment and reputation of the angels that he aracted,
and investment bankers may judge him by the track record of the venture capitalists that
commied to his deal (Sherman, 2012). Within this list I would try to discuss the details of
nancing by venture capitalist (traditional as well as corporate i.e. IVC and CVC), business
angels and crowdfunding in Indian context with some general background.
In this article, I review a recent literature that has addressed the issues and challenges
of nancial intermediaries or nancing of innovation in impacting the product market in-
novation. As I focus this article on the nancing of innovation, therefore I skip many other
important factors for innovation: for example, the role of intellectual property, demand-
side factors such as the size of the market, the supply of talented scientists and engineers,
and spillovers across rms. In addition, we leave out the literature on the impact of tech-
nological revolutions on nancial markets, which is related to asset pricing rather than the
real eects of corporate nancing choices (Kerr and Nanda, 2014). But I will try to man-
age all these topics in future. e schematic arrangement of this article will look like this:
Section 2 discusses the usual frictions/barriers behind the nancing of innovation, which
in turn make it more dierent type of investment than the investment in other type of
project. In Section 3, I do detail analysis (theoretical) of nancing innovation concerning
dierent mechanisms which operate in each channel of capital (such as angel investment,
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venture capital and crowd-funding to some extent) between innovators/entrepreneurs and
nanciers/investors. In this context, I also discuss how far these are the solutions to the
nancial frictions/barriers to innovative activities. Section 4 focuses on nancing of dif-
ferent innovative activities in the case of India. Finally, Section 5 critically analyses the
implications of this article and outlines some promising areas of Indian nancial as well as
entrepreneurial system in promoting innovation.
2 Financing Problems: Some Frictions
In a frictionless world, where all positive NPV projects are nanced, one should not expect
the sources of nance to impact the nature of innovation being conducted by a rm. But the
real world is full of frictions. ere are several features of the innovation process, however,
introduce important frictions, and these frictions can lead to nancing constraints for rms
aiming to undertake innovative strategies, as well as impact how the sources of capital have
a bearing on the outcome of the innovation process.Now, if we look at the basic assumptions
behind this friction scenario, we would see that there is no perfect market i.e. information
distribution is imperfect, leading to positive transaction costs, individuals are self-interest
maximiser as well as opportunistic behaviour and so on. In fact, nancing of innovative
projects or activities is to some extent dierent from nancing other types of projects (Kerr
and Nanda, 2014).
• Firstly, It is widely argued that innovative activities are dicult to nance in a com-
petitive market system. It is because of the undesired gap between private rate of
return and social rate of return which is termed as spillover gap, leading to under-
nancing in innovation. In fact, there are many studies or experiments which esti-
mate the rate of return to R&D nancing on the basis of the rm-, industry-, and
national-level data. It is clearly resulted that though the examined investments gen-
erate high private returns, but the social rates return i.e. the spillover eects between
rms, industries or countries, are basically 2-3 times more than that, providing a ra-
tionale for public support of R&D investment. Generally, this argument will be faded
in the context of modern intellectual property right system. It is found that follow-
ing an invention is not costless, it could cost as much as 50-75% of the original cost
of invention. (Hall, 2002). In reality, it is important to note that a consideration of
how publicly-funded R&D aects the private sector (e.g. developed socioeconomic
structure, which is dicult to capture in traditional spillover framework) is likely to
underestimate the social returns to this nancing (Frontier Economics Ltd, 2014).
Nevertheless, R&D is not the only activity driving innovation. Other activities such
as design, soware and rm-specic human capital represent signicant amounts of
nancing by rms, and much less is known about the private and social returns to
these wider nancing (Frontier Economics Ltd, 2014).
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Figure 1: Twelve dierent ways of nancing any growing business
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• Secondly, using a systematic approach to reviewing the literature, eight factors which
create uncertainty in processes of innovation are identied, namely: technological
uncertainty, market uncertainty, regulatory or institutional uncertainty, social or po-
litical uncertainty, acceptance or legitimacy uncertainty, managerial uncertainty, tim-
ing uncertainty, and consequence uncertainty (Jalonen, 2012). Indeed, investors must
typically decidewhether or not to fund an innovative project with very limited knowl-
edge of the odds of success, a situation that is best described as “Knightian uncer-
tainty”, which cannot be calculated via probabilities, whether objective or subjective
(Knight, 1921; Dicks and Fulghieri, 2014; Mazzucato, 2013). e factors of overall
uncertainty and their manifestations in innovation processes are in the following:
– Technological Uncertainty:
∗ Due to the novelty of technology, as its details are unknown
∗ Uncertainty regarding knowledge required to use new technology
– Market Uncertainty:
∗ Unclear customer needs
∗ Lack of knowledge about the behavior of competitors
∗ Diculties in predicting the price development of raw materials and com-
peting products and services
– Regulatory or Institutional Uncertainty:
∗ Ambiguous regulatory and institutional environment
– Social or Political Uncertainty:
∗ Diversity of interests among stakeholders of innovation processes
∗ Power struggle
– Acceptance or Legitimacy Uncertainty:
∗ Necessary skills and knowledge contradict existing skills and knowledge
possessed by perceived users of innovation
∗ Innovation threatens individual’s basic values and/or organization’s norms
– Managerial Uncertainty:
∗ Fear of failure
∗ Lack of requisite tools to manage risk inherent in innovation process
– Timing Uncertainty:
∗ Lack of information in the early phases of innovation
∗ Ambiguity of information in the late phases of innovation
∗ Temporal complexity
– Consequence Uncertainty:
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∗ Indirect consequences
∗ Undesirable consequences
∗ Unintended consequences
• irdly, in nancing innovative activities, although we know that two sided cooper-
ation is required, but sometimes it is true that an entrepreneur plays most important
roles to make successful his/her company like Mark Zuckerberg for Facebook, Je
Bezos for Amazon. Now question is: what are common success factors? I think due
to exploratory spirit, discipline and good business sense some entrepreneurs become
more popular. In addition to this, as a potential one, a successful entrepreneur could
predict the success of new idea in the future i.e. he could estimate or project the
global market potential and sales gure of some product/service, he could foresee
the technological challenges and potential behavioral changes of that produced prod-
uct/service. Actually, an entrepreneur as well as investor (may be) try to mitigate
those above mentioned uncertainties or factors of partial transparency. However, the
nancing process in innovative startups can be described as a multi-stage principal-
agent problem (Figure 2) where the simple problem is marked by red dashes exchang-
ing investment and return between principal and agent. So what does one do in this
problem? It actually depends on the what stage of nancial relationship one looks
at i.e. before they did the deal which is the le side in that gure (Figure 3) or aer
the deal. In le side, we have double sided problem i.e. the hidden characteristics
are from entrepreneur as well as investor side, and if they don’t look at the potential
relationship in a good way, they would end in adverse selection. So it might be the
case that in one hand the nancier is nancing in such company that is not making
money, and on the other hand innovator obtains nancing from someone who is not
helping at all. Aer the deal has taken place, there is single sided asymmetry i.e. the
nancier (here it is VC) has to prevent the hidden characteristics from innovator side
e.g. whether he/she is working well or not. is last problem generates, generally, a
moral hazard and in order to reduce this the nancier has to do excessive screening
as well as to match their interests at the same line. Is it practical? Answer is yes
of course… for instance, we can refer the case of Motionlo, an analytics company,
whose CEO was accused of defrauding nanciers. erefore, some nanciers are not
as savvy as Peter iel and spend money lavishly (Breel, 2014).
• Fourthly, according to David Dicks and Paolo Fulghieri (in a preliminary and incom-
plete article on Uncertainty and Innovation), uncertainty aversion generates innova-
tion waves. Uncertainty aversion causes investors to treat dierent uncertain loer-
ies as complements, a property that we refer to as uncertainty hedging. Uncertainty
hedging by investors produces strategic complementarity in entrepreneurial behav-
ior, producing innovationwaves. Specically, when one entrepreneur has a successful
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Figure 2: Multi-Stage Principal-Agent Construct
Figure 3: Information Asymmetry
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rst-stage project, equity valuation, entrepreneur utility, and the intensity of innova-
tion increase for other entrepreneurs as well. us, entrepreneurs are more willing to
innovate if they expect other entrepreneurs are going to innovate as well, resulting
in multiple equilibriums. erefore, their model can thus explain why there are some
periods when investment in innovation is “hot,”and venture capitalists are more will-
ing to invest in risky investment projects tainted by signicant uncertainty (Dicks
and Fulghieri, 2014).
erefore, we can see that although the uncertainty and its various forms create some fric-
tions or barriers in nancing innovation, it ultimately leads to more and more innovations
through innovation waves.
3 Financing Innovation: eoretical Discussion
Actually, in this article I ammore concerned about the nancing of dierent start-ups rather
than the nancing of established publicly listed companies. Now the question is: what is
the dierence between a established publicly listed company and a start-up? However,
this dierence would ultimately lead to the dierence between corporate nance and en-
trepreneurial nance. ink about two companies… One is Daimler and another is Out-
ery. First of all look at Daimler and you like to buy some shares of it (equity invest-
ment/public equity). In fact, you know that what Daimler is doing? It builds cars and you
may have seen the models, you can look into broker report or other reports etc. And aer
analysis, although you would face some risk as it is an equity investment, you could be
prey sure about the nancial health of the company. But it is also true that the massive
uctuations are less probabilistic. at’s all. Now look at another example i.e. Outery,
a style consultancy rm. In this case, we have to think that is it a good idea to start a
business? ey started well. Suppose you put equity investment in this company. Are you
sure that you can get something back. Indeed, it will depend on many factors viz. good-
ness of that idea, entrepreneurial and other skills of the founder(s). On the basis of those
considerations, you might invest some money in this company. But here the major factor
is uncertainty not the risk. Because the probability distribution is unknown to you. And
this is the entrepreneurial nance, which is about the nancing of start-ups. Actually, these
companies are very uncertain about their future and their success or failure truly depends
upon the activities of the commiee members. Basically, uncertainty is a part and parcel of
innovative activity.
However, in the gure (Figure 4) the pre-early stage nancing is the product of un-
certainty. In fact, you can cope with this uncertainty only through the equity investment
in diversied portfolio, where returns from the successful start-ups could compensate the
losses due to some failed start-ups. In addition, the funding is not only means in this cy-
cle, but also the managerial supports of the angels and VCs i.e. capital with some support
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Figure 4: Startup Financing Cycle
elements is the engine for this type of nancing. So possibilities above and beyond the
nancial investment should be taken into account.
ere are various nancing sources (Figure 5), but I will focus only on equity nancing,
especially external equity nancing. And at the end of the day if we ask ourselves who
will give the money?, then we can nd, more all less, ve possible sources (Figure 6) i.e.
Family & Friends, crowd-funding, business angels, venture capitalists (IVCs), and strategic
investors (CVCs). All these sources are external equity nancing. Moreover, early phase
equity nancing is dierentiated into a informal and formal part. family & friends as well
as business angels are in informal equity, whereas strategic investors as well as venture
capitalists are in formal equity.
Now, in the next subsection, we will discuss some underlying mechanisms in these
nancing which in turn lead to the solution of the nancial barriers/frictions in any inno-
vative start-up. However, as there is a less possibility of geing added value in the form
of know-how or expert advice in the case of nancing through family & friends or crowd-
funding, we will neglect those in this article. us, the whole discussion would revolve
around the nancing through angels and venture capitalists.
3.1 Financing rough Business Angels
Angel investing is something highly successful… For example, Google, Facebook, Ama-
zon, Twier etc. all innovative companies were nanced through angel investments at the
beginning. So obvious question is: what is the denition of a business angel? Basically,
business angel is a wealthy individual who invests in dierent start-up companies with
his/her own money and expertise. As an example, Rajan Anandan, the Google India MD,
13
Figure 5: Sources of Financing
Figure 6: Who gives you the money?
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Figure 7: Dierent Types of Business Angels
is one of the most experienced individual angel investors in India. He has backed more
than 40 Indian start-ups. is type of individuals provides equity or quasi-equity funding
to growth-oriented companies with the aim of achieving a nancial return through capital
gain at exit. In addition to money, business angels also provide value-added services. In
fact, business angels are private investors, but not all private investors are business angels.
e private investors who are purely interested in return, but not in additional supports,
are not considered as business angels.
ere are four dierent types of business angels (according to time spent per investment
and number of investments in current portfolio) (Breel, 2014). ose are:
1. Selective Caretakers: ey spend a lot of time and only picking the cherries. Ac-
tually, they are serial entrepreneurs or highly experienced former managers. eir
expectations about failure are very low (no real portfolio strategy).
– Example: Catarina Fake (co-founded Flicker along with Stewart Buereld).
She has few and selective investments in Esty and Kickstarter.
2. Part-time Angels: ey generally have full-time job but have enough money to
invest. Basically, they are new and inexperienced investors or non-lead ”expert in-
vestors”. ey oen still with full-time investment. ey are very young but they
also have mixed investment portfolio.
– Example: Ashton Kutcher (actor, producer and former model). He has several
high prole investments such as ipboard, Airbnb, Skype etc.
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3. Portfolio Investors:ey have a lot of diverse investments but they also hold chair-
man or CEO positions. ey, generally, encounter good nancial windfall as well as
act as internet investors with non-lead participants. ey have very young invest-
ment portfolio.
– Example: Ron Conway the super angel (founder and managing partner at An-
gel Investors). He has a lot of small investments with outstanding performance
e.g. Google, Facebook, Twier,Paypal etc.
4. Full-time Angel Investors: ey have a diverse portfolio and spend most of their
time investing in promising start-ups. ey have long experience as angel or vc in-
vestor with back oce and fund structure.
– Example: Reid Homan (VP of paypal, founder of Linkedin, partner at Grey-
lock). Forbes called him ”Silicon Vally’s uber-investor.”
Now we have to see that how do business angels do business? is can be expressed in
a three stage process (Figure 8). However, at the end of the day, business angels are mainly
motivated by fun and interest in their potential target and its team (Breel, 2014). In reality,
presence of dierent angel networks have made the nancing process much easier and
organised. But the pitching, screening, monitoring and due diligence things become more
and more rigorous than before, helping accurate and ecient fund management. Angels
can also consider making multiple rounds of nancing based on the progress achieved in
the earlier round of nancing. Besides this, angel investment also shares a clear dierence
in approach from acceleration and incubation. ough they oer entrepreneurs/innovator
good opportunities early on, they basically dier with each other for the degree of nancial
support as well as management/expertise support and network eect (Rajan and Jain, 2012).
3.2 Financing rough Venture Capital
e denition of venture capital is clear and grounded in theory. In general, venture capital
is characterised by the following:
• Venture capital rms supply equity capital or corresponding capital for high growth,
young, small and medium companies.
• Venture capital nancing consists not only in supplying nancial resources – it is
linked tightly to the oer of management services for the companies receiving the
investment.
• Venture capital companies are investors with a long-term perspective which achieve
their return through capital gains.
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Figure 8: Business Fundamentals of Angels
Figure 9: Angels vs VCs
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Figure 10: Structure of Investment rough Venture Capital
Indeed, though both angel investment and venture capital are apparently same, there are
some dierences on the basis of degree of nancing and management support (Figure 9).
Besides this, in case of venture capital, you will get a heterogeneous network of investment
as venture capitalists manage the pooled money of others. Nevertheless, venture capital
companies can be categorised in to various groups. ose are:
1. Pure Investment Companies: ey are most common venture capital form. ey
invest into small and medium-sized companies in all phases which are not traded on
stock exchage.
– Example: Sequoia Capital, Greylock Partners etc.
2. Corporate Investment Companies: ey are typical venture capital fund within a
big and established companies. ey invest mostly in hi-tech start-ups within familiar
sectors or in completely new business idea.
– Example: Bosch,Intel capital, Google Ventures etc.
3. Publicly Funded companies:eymake available capital frompublic sources. ese
venbture capital companies oen provide subsidised loans at reduced interest rate in
the form of dormant stakes in companies.
– Example: High-Tech Gru¨nderfonds etc.
In real situation, nancing through venture capital takes a cyclical form, starting from
upward trend (i.e. increasing returns & increasing capital inow) to downward trend (i.e.
oversupply & falling returns – lile capital inow) in the nancial market. Although aer
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recovery of the market it follows the same cyclical process, but the time interval of each
complete cycle is uncertain to us.
In this context we can also discuss the corporate venture capital (CVC).e fundamental
idea behind the CVC is how to make the large corporations become more entrepreneurial?
Now it is a complete package of motivating, organising, nancing and managing dierent
innovative start-ups. Moreover, the goals of CVC are much more diversied than that of
real or independent venture capital (IVC). In reality, besides the nancial goals of high re-
turns and the social/PR goals for image benets, CVC has additional four strategic goals
i.e. collecting technological knowledge, promoting entrepreneurial spirit, increasing e-
ciency, and enhancement of growth possibilities. erefore, it is the duty of an innova-
tor/entrepreneur to think of a strategy or set of strategies (through selecting nancial in-
termediaries) which would be t for his start-up (Breel, 2014).
3.3 Angel Investment and Venture Capital: Some Studies
On the basis of above fundamentals of angel and venture capital investment, it can be easily
argued that angels and venture capitalists foster innovative activities within an economy
not only through the provision of nancing, but also through a complete package of acute
monitoring and screening, developing ecient management teams, and enhancing network
in related sphere. In fact, these ingredients/inputs try to oset those above mentioned fric-
tions or nancial barriers regarding the nancing of innovation. However, due to lack of
data in early stage ventures, there are very lile studies examining the above claims in the
case of angel investment (e.g. Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar, 2014), though there are some prac-
tical studies supporting the above assertion about venture capital (e.g. Hellman and Puri,
2000; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011).
One major problem of examining the eectiveness of dierent nancial intermediaries
such as angels or venture capitalists in boosting dierent innovative activities is the endo-
geneity of the intermediaries’ decision to nance i.e. nanciers are, generally, interested to
nance some innovative and fresh ideas creating enormous value in future or some excel-
lent things of the start-ups might inuence nancier as well as the expansion path of those
rms. So causal analysis between the intervention and performance is to some extent dif-
cult for start-ups (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2014). But this problem is managed in Kerr,
Lerner, and Schoar, 2014 paper by using regression discontinuity approach. In this paper,
they nd a signicant upward jump in the performance, likelihood of sustaining in future,
successful exits, and employment level of the nanced start-ups by two angel groups. Over-
all, it is found that the successes of dierent start-ups are dependent upon the special value
added services of those nancial intermediaries.
Similarly, in Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011 paper examines several related
questions regarding the eciency gains (i.e. TFP, pre and post investment analysis, sales
or reduction in costs, and dierent ways of successful exit etc.) generated by venture cap-
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ital (VC) investment in private rms. eir analysis depicts that the overall eciency of
VC-backed rms is higher than that of non-VC-backed rms at every point in time, and it
is mainly due to the additional strict services provided by those VC rms. Nevertheless, if
analyse about comparative eectiveness of nurturing product market innovation through
angels an venture capitalists (e.g. Goldfarb et al., 2009), we would get that as angel investors
being cash constrained, VC participation is a necessary condition for nancing larger in-
novative activities. From that paper, we can also nd that VCs obtain more rigid control
rights in early stage nancing relative to angel investors, consistent with VC participation
in managing the rms they invest in.
Besides this, there are several studies which have showed that the role of the nancing
through private equity is also very much eective for spurring innovation within an econ-
omy. Lerner, Sorensen, and Stro¨mberg, 2011 paper examines the eect of investments by
private equity groups on rms’ long-run investments, focusing on innovative activities as
measured by patenting activity. ey have found that the post-PE nancing for some sample
US rms leads to more frequent citation of their patents. Similarly, there is a cross-country
study of the impact of an euro of private equity nancing relative to a euro of industrial R&D.
It focuses on a sample of European countries. Its estimates imply that while private equity
investment accounts for 8% of aggregate (private equity plus R&D) industrial spending, PE
accounts for as much as 12% of industrial innovation (Popov and Roosenboom, 2009).
4 Financing Innovation: Indian Context
e scope and development of dierent means of nancing innovation in India, which have
started to take-o, was narrow and gloomy. It was happened mainly due to the credit con-
straints resulting from the overemphasis on the socioeconomic issues. It is true that though,
at that time, we could get funding for innovative start-ups from commercial banks and gov-
ernment nancial institutions, it was provided on the basis of mortgaging sucient collat-
eral. It was, indeed, very problematic for the new entrepreneurs to start their enterprises,
especially for those who wanted to raise nancial capital for their fresh ideas (of course
value creating). Hence, most of them used to be dependent on their own nancial resources
as well as resources of the family and friends to make real their innovative initiatives (Sa-
hai, 2009). However, the recent scenario of nancing innovation is completely dierent
form the past. Now we have crowd-funding, angel nancing, venture capital, and private
equity. ough we have also several direct and indirect governmental schemes for nanc-
ing of innovation, here I am more concerned about current prospects of private sources of
nancing (or equity nancing) in India, especially angel investment, venture capital and
private equity.
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Figure 11: Yearwise Distribution of Angel Investments
4.1 Angel Investment in India
Although the angel type of investment has been taking place in India for a long time in
the form of private investment in the joint stock companies, it was not known by angel
investment. It is a recent development – that has happen with the emergence of modern
entrepreneurial nance. e remarkable turning point in the Indian angel investment was
the establishment of Indian Angel Network in 2006. Subsequently, the angel investment
scenario became more structured through initiation of more such networks in dierent re-
gions of this country. In fact, over the period the gap between investors and entrepreneurs
becomes less and less due to improvement of dierent internet facilities. But India still has
a long way of journey in angel nancing for dierent innovative start-ups. is eld is
still at the developing stage (we can see from the Figure 11 that though yearwise trend of
angel investments is rather positive, the number of investments is quite small), suering
from limitation of localisation of nancing opportunities. Actually, the distribution of an-
gel investments are concentrated to sophisticated regions (like Bangalore, Mumbai, Delhi,
Chennai, Pune and Hyderabad) and limited trendy companies (such as soware and online
services). However, the overseas angel investments come from investors who, basically, join
an Indian syndicate in investing in a company with Indian and overseas operations as well
as from foreign wings of Indian Angel Network (Sabarinathan, 2014; Rajan and Jain, 2012).
Nonetheless, the available VI database shows that from the last decade some specic
sectors like online services, enterprise soware, education, Mobile VAS and e-commerce
(recently) have aracted most of the yearly angel investments towards them. According to
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Figure 12: Spatial Distribution of Angel Investments
G. Sabarinathan, Associate Professor of IIMB, there are several reasons behind this sectoral
concentration of angel investments. Basically, investments ow to that sectors which have
the avour of the season or trendy factor, high potential of success in future, hope of geing
quick and protable exits and so on (Sabarinathan, 2014). In reality, aer angel investment
we have to think about nancing through venture capital for successful start-up companies.
VC investment means formal nancing scheme, which requires extreme commitments form
the side of entrepreneurs making it more dicult to select a scheme. All angel funded rms
are not able to raise VC fund, for example, of the 320 funding transactions reported by the
VI database, 59 companies (18%) raised follow-on funding from venture capital investors in
the last decade. From the given data in Sabarinathan, 2014 paper, I just run a simple panel
data regression model, especially random eects model, to test some nancing issues i.e.
relative eectiveness of network versus non-network angel investments in deal making as
well as raising VC fund, the trend of average time taken to raise VC by companies aer
angel nancing over the concerned period, and sectoral bias in funding etc. All the results
of the econometric models are in the Section 6 i.e. Appendix section.
Indeed, aer testing I am able to infer that angel networks are much more (more than
double) eective in making deals (Models 1 & 2) as well as in raising VC (more than 4 times)
than the non-networks (Model 3). Besides this, it can be tested that the average time taken
each year for raising VC fund of angel backed start-up rms is falling over time (Model
4). Most recent angel nancing has taken less time to raise VC for the innovative start-
ups (Model 5). According to G. Sabarinathan, this could be due to two reasons. First one is:
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Figure 13: Indian Annual VC Investment 2006-13 (US$b)
angels gain more heterogeneous experience (due to more deals across time) to perform such
nancing management so that they could aract VC nanciers. Second reason is: sectoral
bias (in favour of venture capitalists) in angel investment that impress venture capitalists
beer (Model 6). It should be noted that though the angel investment is progressing day
by day for nancing innovative start-ups in diverse sectors, there is a total absence of the
manufacturing sector (which might be the engine of growth for this economy).
4.2 VC investment in India
India is relatively in a good position for VC nancing of innovation. Actually, India (aer
US, Europe and China) is, fourth in the global VC ranking, experiencing a 13% increase in
dollars invested with a slight fall (2%) in the number of rounds compared to 2012. Although
the overall trend of VC investment is much positive (Figure 13), VC nanciers continue
to be cautious about the early stage, and are increasingly condent in making late-stage
nancing in innovative companies as they scale (Figure 14). Since later-stage has dominated
VC nancing, angel and incubators as well as accelerators are lling the funding gap in the
early-stage. From the table of VC statistics (Figure 15), we can note that the exit environment
becomes more challenging (Model 7). e reasons are recent (in 2013) low level of IPO exits,
and decline of M&A activity from 16 deals to 13 deals (Pearce, 2014). However, it is true that
now-a-days M&A becomes more or less preferred exit strategy for innovative start-ups.
In reality, if we don’t consider the socio-economic perspective, then we, indeed, would
commit some mistakes to assess the scenario of VC nancing for supporting the new ideas
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Figure 14: VC nancing in dierent stages of development
Figure 15: VC Summary Statistics of India
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(as well as for angels also). It is true that besides screening, monitoring, and due diligence,
which are rm level assessments, we need some assessments which are at the economy or
the society level. For this reason, it would be rational to think about some measures which
benchmark the business condence or aractiveness of our Indian economy to receive in-
stitutional VC funding for innovative start-ups. In this context, we can think about ”e
Venture Capital and Private Equity Country Aractiveness Index”, which is providing ana-
lytical pictures about VC/PE investments to not only business or nancial community, but
also to the politicians for managing/controlling the supply of risk capital in order to a fertile
economic basis for innovative or entrepreneurial (for future growth and development) in
their countries. Emerging nations, like India, can aract VC nancing by high economic
growth potentials. But growth potentials are not the sole factor that make the Indian econ-
omy more aractive for VC investments. Actually, for existence of enriched environment
for venture capitalists, we have to fulll some socio-economic and institutional prerequi-
sites. Side by side, we need to recognise a good timing for aracting investors, which can
be depicted through that referred multidimensional index (Groh, Liechtenstein, and Lieser,
2014).
From the Index’s website I get some fundamentals:
Investors in Venture Capital and Private Equity funds have a key objective: to get
access to transactions with satisfying risk and return ratios. ey look globally to
achieve their goals, and oen set their sights on emerging regions. To nd prime in-
vestment opportunities, investors generally look several years down the road and
focus on specic factors like: economic activity (GDP, ination, unemployment
rate); size and liquidity of capital markets; taxation; investor protection and cor-
porate governance; the human and social environment (including human capital,
labor market policies and crime); and entrepreneurial culture and opportunities
(including innovation capacity, the ease of doing business and the development of
high-tech industries). e idea of the Venture Capital and Private Equity Coun-
try Aractiveness Index is to take into account all of these factors across dierent
nations and to determine the relative positioning of particular economies and re-
gions as they stand in relation with respect to their aractiveness for investment
in Venture Capital and Private Equity assets (Groh et al., 2014).
In short, this multidimensional index is composed of six items and then each item is also
composed of some sub-items. For India (Figure 16) we have the following Key Driver Perfor-
mance in 2014. However, Despite its multi-dimensionality, we can doubt that whether this
index truly inuential in the real world of VC investment or not. In the test of its strength
in the real world, I nd that the score of this index across time is highly correlated (signi-
cant) with the ow of VC investments (Model 9). In another way, I have also found the score
elasticity of VC nancing, and in this case I get signicant high elasticity. e results are in
appendix section B. Now, if we analyse the radar chart, we can identify some strengths and
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weaknesses of our Indian economy for aracting VC nancing for fresh start-ups. We are
excellent in economic activity and to some extent in capital market, but mostly we have to
improve ourselves in the remaining four indicators. Especially, our rst priority is to focus
more on ”Taxation” sub-index as our government is very poor in providing entrepreneurial
as well as angel & VC investment tax credit (In the budget 2015-16, there are several propos-
als for encouragingMSME entrepreneurs, for instance, loans to MSME sector being brought
under priority sector, creation of small nance banks to supply credit to MSMEs etc.), and
reducing Administrative burden. Second priority should be to improve ”Human and Social
Environment” sub-index, which is in lower position due to labor regulations and excessive
bribing & corruption. Subsequently, we have to take care about ”Investor Protection and
Corporate Governance” sub-index including security of property rights and quality of legal
enforcement. And lastlywe have the option to revamp the existing entrepreneurial opportu-
nities through reducing burdens of starting and running a business, maintaining simplicity
of closing a business, and incentivising innovation throughout the economy. erefore,
government has to be more active and eective to clear dierent obstructions on the way of
nancing fresh and innovative ideas or activities for achieving multi-dimensional growth
in the future.
However, in this context if we analyse a brief scenario of private equity in India, then
we will see that the Indian PE nancing is much more improved than the other two types
of nancing. In recent past, India witnessed an annual increase in PE/VC deal value by
16%, from $10.2b 2012 to $11.8b in 2013. Whereas, deal volume grew by about 26% from
551 deals in 2012 to 696 deals in 2013 (Figure 17). In fact, the overall volume of deals in
India increased across sectors. e overall growth of 26% was predominantly fuelled by
the IT and ITES (information technology enabled services), health-care and BFSI (banking,
nancial services and insurance) sectors. In case of exit, the total number of exits shot up
signicantly, by 43% in 2013, but the overall value of exits remained at at 2012 levels of $6.8
billion. Only two sectors—IT and ITES, and BFSI—have shown good returns on the invested
PE capital.(Sheth, Singhal, and Taneja, 2014). erefore, we can conclude that those sectors
are more likely to contribute product market innovation within the economy. Basically, the
same type of sectoral bias can be noticed for angel and VC nancing. In practice, it is true
that before investment capitalists, generally, do some analysis at sector level as well as at
economy level. At that time, the corresponding factors of the society (which may be latent)
might present some sectors relatively more condent from business point of view. us, if
some sectors become less condent or weak (due to some internal and/or external causes) in
terms of providing returns aer exit, then those sectors are always be neglected by private
sector. So, still we have some frictions in nancing innovation which could be removed only
through governmental nancing in nationwide innovation and R&D for a fertile future.
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Figure 16: Key Driver Performance in Radar Chart
Figure 17: Trend of Indian PE and VC (Source: Bain PE deals database)
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Figure 18: e number of exits increased bymore than 40%, but the total exit value remained
at from 2012 to 2013
Figure 19: IT/ITES and BFSI have outperformed in terms of returns
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5 A Way Ahead: Some Implications
I think that I am, to some extent, failed to show the the eectiveness of angel and VC -
nancing for innovation in India. Actually, when we say something about innovation, it is
nothing but some fresh ideas which could create value. And to support that fresh ideas we
require some funds. ese can be provided through public or private source. In this article,
I am more concerned about private sources. But there is a massive role of the government
to support those start-ups through creating a enthusiastic environment for entrepreneurs
and/or supporting directly by various means for innovation. ough we can’t doubt the
government’s role in supporting innovation, we would, perhaps, be skeptical about roles
of private sources. Generally, to measure the eectiveness of private sources in nurturing
product market innovation, especially the roles of angels and venture capitalists, we can
use the successful exits as well as sustainable business life aer excellent exits. Here, it is
implicitly assumed that those angels and venture capitalists would provide support to inno-
vative rms only. In fact, the notion of innovation is broad and multi-dimensional, and to
sustain something in a competitive market you have to be enough innovative to get power
to produce value. In this context, we can think about the ”Global Innovation Index” (poor
condition for India; see Model 10), which relies on two sub-indices, the Innovation Input
Sub-Index and the Innovation Output Sub-Index, each built around key pillars. On one
hand, there are ve input pillars comprising elements of the national economy that enable
innovative activities: (1) Institutions, (2) Human capital and research, (3) Infrastructure, (4)
Market sophistication, and (5) Business sophistication. And in another hand, there are two
output pillars which reveal actual evidence of innovation outputs: (6) Knowledge and tech-
nology outputs and (7) Creative outputs. Each pillar is divided into sub-pillars and each
sub-pillar is composed of individual indicators (81 in total). Sub-pillar scores are calculated
as the weighted average of individual indicators; pillar scores are calculated as the weighted
average of sub-pillar scores (Dua, Lanvin, and Wunsch-Vincent, 2014).
Now if we talk about the signicance of the dierent private funding in fostering in-
novation without considering those above components (i.e. ceteris paribus condition, but
not the principle of general equilibrium), we would commit some mistakes. Indeed, many
of the pillars could be controlled through the good government with less narrow politics.
Besides this, there are several VC nancing (dierent development nance institutions) in
India which are promoted by central government as well as state governments. I have just
skipped them, but they are verymuch eective for nationwide to grass-root level innovative
activities.
Nevertheless, corporate venture capital (CVC) companies are also important for nur-
turing innovative start-ups. Corporate venture capital is the least understood category of
venture capital. e concept has been around in the U.S. and other developed countries for
a long time. ite a few of the Fortune 100 companies – Intel, Cisco, Unilever, BP – have a
separate venture capital entity for such investments. In India, corporate venture capital is a
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Figure 20: Global Innovation Index 2014 Conceptual Framework
relatively recent phenomenon. Local companies such as Reliance, Airtel and Future Group
have started their own investment entities. Hence we could say that despite of the trendy
means of nancing innovationwith lump sum exit returns, the ultimate signicance of those
means should be justied on the basis of that multi-dimensional index of innovation.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Results of Panel Data Regression
Model 1: Random-eects (GLS), using 288 observations
Using Nerlove’s transformation
Included 24 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 12
Dependent variable: AngelInvestments
Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −387.165 63.9970 −6.0497 0.0000
Time 0.192852 0.0318860 6.0482 0.0000
Network 0.269197 0.0629040 4.2795 0.0000
Mean dependent var 1.111111 S.D. dependent var 2.965801
Sum squared resid 1568.119 S.E. of regression 2.341566
Log-likelihood −652.6870 Akaike criterion 1311.374
Schwarz criterion 1322.363 Hannan–inn 1315.778
σˆ2ε = 5.23754
σˆ2u = 0.226159
θ = 0.642379
Breusch-Pagan test –
Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specic error = 0
Asymptotic test statistic: χ2(1) = 3.86127
with p-value = 0.0494128
Hausman test –
Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent
Asymptotic test statistic: χ2(1) = 1.08713e-12
with p-value = 0.999999
Model 2: Random-eects (GLS), using 288 observations
Using Nerlove’s transformation
Included 24 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 12
Dependent variable: AngelInvestments
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Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −386.955 63.8692 −6.0585 0.0000
Time 0.192852 0.0318225 6.0602 0.0000
NonNetwork 0.115173 0.0260638 4.4189 0.0000
Mean dependent var 1.111111 S.D. dependent var 2.965801
Sum squared resid 1520.919 S.E. of regression 2.306057
Log-likelihood −648.2860 Akaike criterion 1302.572
Schwarz criterion 1313.561 Hannan–inn 1306.976
σˆ2ε = 5.23754
σˆ2u = 0.0473715
θ = 0.642379
Breusch-Pagan test –
Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specic error = 0
Asymptotic test statistic: χ2(1) = 10.6349
with p-value = 0.00110971
Hausman test –
Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent
Asymptotic test statistic: χ2(1) = 1.27898e-12
with p-value = 0.999999
6.2 Results of Ordinary Regression
Model 3: OLS, using observations 1–24
Dependent variable: VCFunding
Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −1.43658 0.627041 −2.2910 0.0330
Network 0.487945 0.123217 3.9600 0.0008
NonNetwork 0.116521 0.0511903 2.2762 0.0340
Index 0.0523530 0.0411425 1.2725 0.2178
Mean dependent var 2.458333 S.D. dependent var 4.863164
Sum squared resid 38.79213 S.E. of regression 1.392698
R2 0.928685 Adjusted R2 0.917988
F (3, 20) 86.81593 P-value(F ) 1.22e–11
Log-likelihood −39.81649 Akaike criterion 87.63297
Schwarz criterion 92.34519 Hannan–inn 88.88313
Model 4: OLS, using observations 1–11
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Dependent variable: Ave Days Taken
Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 341273. 66228.5 5.1530 0.0006
Time −169.579 32.9868 −5.1408 0.0006
Mean dependent var 805.1818 S.D. dependent var 755.8050
Sum squared resid 1451165 S.E. of regression 401.5477
R2 0.745963 Adjusted R2 0.717736
F (1, 9) 26.42788 P-value(F ) 0.000611
Log-likelihood −80.45323 Akaike criterion 164.9065
Schwarz criterion 165.7022 Hannan–inn 164.4048
Model 5: OLS, using observations 1–11
Dependent variable: Ave Days Taken
Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 1305.20 314.599 4.1488 0.0025
Angeldeals −17.2420 8.41921 −2.0479 0.0709
Mean dependent var 805.1818 S.D. dependent var 755.8050
Sum squared resid 3896590 S.E. of regression 657.9927
R2 0.317873 Adjusted R2 0.242081
F (1, 9) 4.194025 P-value(F ) 0.070850
Log-likelihood −85.88577 Akaike criterion 175.7715
Schwarz criterion 176.5673 Hannan–inn 175.2699
Model 6: OLS, using observations 1–11
Dependent variable: VCFunded
Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 906.966 937.474 0.9675 0.3616
Angeldeals 0.189861 0.0728633 2.6057 0.0313
Time −0.451809 0.467800 −0.9658 0.3624
Mean dependent var 5.363636 S.D. dependent var 4.455844
Sum squared resid 82.79689 S.E. of regression 3.217081
R2 0.582983 Adjusted R2 0.478728
F (2, 8) 5.591928 P-value(F ) 0.030242
Log-likelihood −26.71005 Akaike criterion 59.42010
Schwarz criterion 60.61378 Hannan–inn 58.66764
Model 7: OLS, using observations 1–4
Dependent variable: IPOs
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Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 10.9667 0.859263 12.7629 0.0061
Investment −5.66667 0.577350 −9.8150 0.0102
Mean dependent var 2.750000 S.D. dependent var 2.217356
Sum squared resid 0.300000 S.E. of regression 0.387298
R2 0.979661 Adjusted R2 0.969492
F (1, 2) 96.33333 P-value(F ) 0.010222
Log-likelihood −0.495220 Akaike criterion 4.990440
Schwarz criterion 3.763028 Hannan–inn 2.296977
Model 8: OLS, using observations 1–4
Dependent variable: IPOs
Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 10.2056 2.19022 4.6597 0.0431
Rounds −0.0400303 0.0114379 −3.4998 0.0728
Mean dependent var 2.750000 S.D. dependent var 2.217356
Sum squared resid 2.070393 S.E. of regression 1.017446
R2 0.859634 Adjusted R2 0.789452
F (1, 2) 12.24850 P-value(F ) 0.072835
Log-likelihood −4.358642 Akaike criterion 12.71728
Schwarz criterion 11.48987 Hannan–inn 10.02382
Testing Strength of thee Venture Capital & Private Equity Country Aractiveness Index. e
results are:
Correlation coecients, using the observations 1–4
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.9500 for n = 4
VCPE Score VC Investment
1.0000 0.9951 VCPE Score
1.0000 VC Investment
Model 9: OLS, using observations 1–4
Dependent variable: ln VC Investment
Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const −4.76116 0.251358 −18.9418 0.0028
ln VCPE Score 1.25401 0.0617146 20.3196 0.0024
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Mean dependent var 0.339474 S.D. dependent var 0.306012
Sum squared resid 0.001354 S.E. of regression 0.026022
R2 0.995179 Adjusted R2 0.992769
F (1, 2) 412.8854 P-value(F ) 0.002413
Log-likelihood 10.30585 Akaike criterion −16.61169
Schwarz criterion −17.83910 Hannan–inn −19.30516
Model 10: OLS, using observations 1–7
Dependent variable: GII Score
Coecient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 5290.61 863.853 6.1244 0.0017
Time −2.61118 0.429655 −6.0774 0.0017
Mean dependent var 40.64551 S.D. dependent var 7.336231
Sum squared resid 38.50302 S.E. of regression 2.774996
R2 0.880767 Adjusted R2 0.856920
F (1, 5) 36.93460 P-value(F ) 0.001743
Log-likelihood −15.89946 Akaike criterion 35.79892
Schwarz criterion 35.69074 Hannan–inn 34.46184
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